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 ABSTRACT 
This study compares the impact of downsizing and reducing pay on collective 
organizational commitment and firm financial performance.  An examination of 
organizations operating under a salary schedule system in Korea shows that there is no 
significant difference between the effect of downsizing and reducing pay on collective 
organizational commitment and firm financial performance.  However, compared to 
downsizing, reducing pay yields better financial performance for organizations that invest 
relatively highly in training of their employees through maintaining higher levels of 
organizational commitment. 
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Rapid changes in business environments have forced many organizations to 
develop more effective methods of managing their human capital.  In response to the 
changes, increasing attention has been paid to employment practices that can create firm-
specific human capital that are difficult for other organizations to imitate (Barney, 1991; 
Barney & Wright, 1998).  A group of committed employees is viewed as valuable and 
relatively rare firm specific resource that are difficult for other organizations to imitate 
(Gong, Law, Chang & Xin, 2009) and is argued to drive organizational performance by 
using discretion to carry out tasks in ways that are consistent with organizational goals 
(Arthur, 1994).  As a result, over the last several decades, the study of strategic human 
resource management (SHRM) has examined HR management best practices (e.g. Pfeffer, 
1994; Osterman, 1994), HR systems or bundles of practices (e.g. Lawler, 1986; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Walton, 1985; Lawler, Mohman & Ledford, 1995; Huselid, 1995), and 
various employment relationships (e.g. Lepak & Snell, 1999; Rousseau, 1995; Tsui, 
Pearce, Porter & Tripoli, 1997) that can yield superior firm performance under the 
assumption and belief that certain HR practices (or group of HR practices) and 
employment relationships may better develop and maintain a group of committed 
employees (Arthur, 1994).  Reflecting this, these HR practices (or bundles of HR 
practices) were often labeled as high “commitment” HR practices and systems (e.g. 
Iverson & Zatzick, 2007; Kwon, Bae & Lawler, 2010; McClean & Collins, 2011).  
However, SHRM studies tend to focus on “improvements” that these practices or 
relationships make and have been less clear about which practices or relationships can be 
better under unfavorable circumstances.  
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Two recessions that greatly impacted organizations worldwide in the last decade 
(i.e. recession started by the IT crisis in 2001 and by the financial crisis in 2008) have 
forced many organizations to reduce costs while keeping business operations flowing as 
smoothly as possible through maintaining levels of employee commitment.  Among 
various labor cost reduction practices, downsizing and reducing pay has known to be the 
most common practices that organizations implement (Zingheim & Schuster, 2002).  
Although the two options both can be effective at reducing labor costs, the choice 
between the two options can send very distinct signals in the employment relationship 
that organizations value.  As a result, the two practices can provide distinct and valuable 
implications in managing the employment relationship and human capital.  However, 
there is a dearth of research in comparing the consequences of the two practices. 
Thus, the objective in this study is to compare the effect of downsizing and 
reducing pay on collective organizational commitment drawing on the expected 
motivational and sorting effect of the two options.  Furthermore, I will examine 
circumstances under which implementing one option can better maintain the level of 
collective organizational commitment relative to the other.  More specifically, I’ll 
examine the firm’s investment in employee training as an important moderator drawing 
on the psychological contract literature (e.g. Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau & 
Greler, 1994; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski & Bravo, 2007).  Finally, based on the belief 
that a group of committed employees can be a firm specific resource that is difficult for 
other organizations to imitate, I will test a moderated mediation model that compares the 
results of downsizing and reducing pay on firm’s financial performance through the 
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mediation of collective organizational commitment that is dependent on the firm’s 
investment in training of its employees. 
This study makes meaningful contributions to the SHRM literature by addressing 
an important issue that has been previously neglected: comparing the consequences of 
HR practices (downsizing versus reducing pay) for labor cost reduction.  Although 
studies that examine the consequences of a downsizing or reducing pay alone can also be 
invaluable by providing significant implications, conducting studies that compare the 
consequences of the two options simultaneously and identifying situations or 
environments where one option yields better outcomes than the other can also provide 
management with meaningful information.   
 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
1) Downsizing and reducing pay 
 In this study, I define downsizing as an organization’s conscious act of a 
reduction in the number of employees.  Here, I distinguish downsizing and natural 
attrition by emphasizing that downsizing is an organization’s “conscious” act and is 
initiated by the organization (e.g. layoffs, buyouts, spinoffs, etc.).  On the other hand, 
natural attrition is a reduction in the number of employees due to voluntary turnover 
exceeding new hires.  In this case, the reduction in number of employees is not intended 
by the organization (unless the organization is intentionally not filling vacant positions).  
This distinction is important because when an act is perceived, people evaluate the actor’s 
action based on the assumption that they make about the actor’s internal state (Robbins, 
2012).  Therefore, it is likely that employees will make assumptions of the organization’s 
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internal state and try to evaluate the action when downsizing is implemented.  On the 
other hand, employees are not likely to make judgments of the organization’s internal 
state in the case of natural attrition since the organization is not the initiator of the event.  
Therefore, downsizing is much more likely to affect employee’s perception towards the 
organization than natural attrition although both events result in reduction in the number 
of employees.   
 Reducing pay, in this study, is defined as an organization’s conscious act of a 
reduction in level of pay of employees.  Here, the intentionality of an act is not 
emphasized since it is extremely unlikely that the reduction in employee’s pay level is 
initiated by actors other than the organization. 
2) The effect of downsizing/reducing pay on collective organizational commitment 
Although organizational commitment has been conceptualized and defined in 
several ways (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990, Morrow, 1983; Wiener & Vardi, 1980, Wright & 
Bonett, 2002), the most frequently studied concept has been the attitudinal organizational 
commitment defined as “the strength of an employee’s emotional attachment to an 
organization and acceptance of the organization’s goals and values” (Wright & Bonett, 
2002).  In this study, attitudinal organizational commitment (hereinafter “organizational 
commitment”) is conceptualized at the firm level since the research question in this study 
is to identify which labor cost reduction practice is preferred in terms of maintaining a 
“group” of committed employees.  Organizational commitment is a construct that can be 
conceptualized and operationalized at the firm-level since it is an employee attitude 
revolving around and directed toward the organization (Chun, Shin, Choi, & Kim, 2013).  
A growing number of studies have conceptualized and operationalized organizational 
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commitment at the group and firm-level (Chun et al, 2013; Simon & Roberson, 2003, 
Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 2005).   
In this section, the expected effect of downsizing and reducing pay on collective 
organizational commitment will be examined from both the motivational and sorting 
points of view. 
The motivational effect of downsizing/reducing pay on collective organizational 
commitment  From the logic of social exchange (Blau, 1964), we can expect that 
downsizing and reducing pay will both reduce organizational commitment of employees.  
Blau’s (1964) social exchange framework posits that employees reciprocate 
correspondingly to the way that they are treated by their organization.  For example, 
employees with a higher perception of organizational support demonstrate higher 
organizational commitment and lower absenteeism (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison 
& Sowa, 1986).  An organization where downsizing has taken place may impose stress 
on its employees by forcing them to adjust to the new work environment since it is likely 
that comparable workflow in downsized organizations is now managed by fewer 
employees due to the elimination of employees and thus workflow restructuring is needed 
to some extent.  Moreover, survivors of a downsized organization may also feel that the 
organization does not value the job security of its employees.  This, in turn, can make 
employees feel less well treated by the organization and thereby feel less attached or 
obligated to the organization.  In a similar vein, employees in pay-reduced organizations 
may also feel less well treated since it is likely that they are now paid less for doing 
comparable work.  Therefore in both cases, employees are likely to reciprocate with 
lower organizational commitment. 
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Empirical results also support this argument.  For example, a field study by 
Brockner and colleagues (1987) shows that the survivors of downsizing experience a 
decrease in the level of organizational commitment.  A study by Knudsen and colleagues 
(2003), which utilizes national employee survey data, also shows a decline in 
organizational commitment among survivors of downsizing.  I know of no study that has 
directly examined the relationship between reducing pay and organizational commitment.  
However, the negative relationship between the two constructs can be expected from the 
fact that various meta-analyses show a positive relationship between pay-level and pay 
satisfaction (e.g. Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006) and between pay satisfaction and 
organizational commitment (e.g. Mathieu & Zajac, 1990).  Therefore, the casual 
sequence of ‘pay reduction  lower pay level  lower pay satisfaction  lower 
organizational commitment’ can be assumed. 
 In summary, from the motivational effect point of view, I expect that downsizing 
and reducing pay will both have negative effects on organizational commitment of 
employees.  And if organizational commitment can be conceptualized and aggregated at 
the firm level, we can also expect that the two options will both have negative effects on 
collective organizational commitment.  However, it is theoretically ambiguous to predict 
which option will have a stronger negative effect on collective organizational 
commitment.  Downsizing imposes adjustments to the workflow restructuring and 
decreases perceived job security while reducing pay lowers the pay level of employees.  
Although there are reasons for assuming the primacy of pay as a motivator (Rottenberg, 
1956; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003), various surveys also show that people value job security 
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over higher pay unless the pay level is too low (Library Worklife, 2009; Omer, 2008; 
Taylor et al., 2012).  
The sorting effect of downsizing/reducing pay on collective organizational 
commitment  While the motivational effect of downsizing and reducing pay both predict 
a decrease in collective organizational commitment, the sorting effect of the two options 
both predict an increase in collective organizational commitment.  In the case of 
downsizing, most firms often have the option of selecting the employees to dismiss.  
Firms may use the opportunity to dismiss the least productive or committed (which 
studies show positive correlations of; e.g. Riketta, 2002) employees.  An interview of 
over 300 business people made by Bewley (1998) also reveals that firms often use layoffs 
to rid themselves of the least capable workers.  Therefore, strictly from the sorting effect 
point of view, firms may be left with employees of higher level of organizational 
commitment after downsizing. 
 In the case of reducing pay, firms may also be left with employees of a higher 
level of organizational commitment when the sorting effect is only considered. This is 
because employees with lower organizational commitment are more likely to turn over 
under an unpleasant shock and pay reduction can be viewed as an unpleasant shock to 
employees.  In alignment with this argument, a study by Hochwarter, Perrewe, Ferris and 
Guercio (1999) shows that an employee is likely to demonstrate a higher level of turnover 
intention when political activities are perceived (unpleasant shock) in his or her 
workplace but this relationship is attenuated by the level of employee’s organizational 
commitment.  Therefore, strictly from the sorting effect point of view, we can also 
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anticipate that the level of collective organizational commitment will increase after 
reducing pay. 
In sum, strictly from a sorting effect point of view, I expect that downsizing and 
reducing pay will both increase collective organizational commitment.  However, it is 
also theoretically ambiguous to predict which option will have a stronger positive effect 
on collective organizational commitment.  Although the immediate sorting effect of 
downsizing can be stronger since the firms can select whom to dismiss and thereby the 
restructuring of the workforces takes place immediately, this effect can be leveled as time 
goes by due to the sorting effect of reducing pay through voluntary turnover. 
Since the motivational effect predicts the same negative relationship and sorting 
effect predicts the same positive relationship between reducing pay and collective 
organizational commitment and between downsizing and collective organizational 
commitment, and it is theoretically ambiguous to predict which relationship will be 
stronger, I will not hypothesize the difference in relative strength of downsizing and 
reducing pay on collective organizational commitment.  This will only be examined 
empirically here. 
3) The moderating effect of an organization’s investment in training on the 
relationship between downsizing/reducing pay and collective organizational 
commitment 
A psychological contract, in an employee-organization relationship, refers to an 
unwritten agreement that sets out what employees expect from organizations, and vice 
versa (Robins, 2012). The psychological contract is held by employees, not by the 
organization or an agent of the organization, as beliefs of obligation between the two 
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parties (Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl, & Solley, 1962; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; 
Rousseau, 1989; Schein, 1965; Sims, 1994).  In the psychological contract, the agreement 
is based on perceived promises and can be formed through various means: written 
documents, oral conversations, organizational policies, etc. (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; 
Rousseau & Greler, 1994; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993).  HR practices are argued to 
be one of the strong factors that can shape psychological contracts (Rousseau & Greler, 
1994). 
 By providing extensive training opportunities to employees, an organization can 
send signals that it values the social exchange relationship, which is to be open-ended and 
long-term, in exchange for the employees’ commitment, with its employees (Abraham & 
Prosch, 2000; Aguinis, 2012; Tsui et al., 1997).  Employees prefer long-term 
relationships over the short-term relationships with the organization to reduce risk in 
fluctuations in income (Abraham & Prosch, 2000).  On the other hand, many 
organizations are interested in labor flexibility to minimize fixed costs.  However, by 
providing training opportunities to employees, and thereby investing in human capital of 
its employees, organization’s flexibility of labor can be weakened by increasing the risk 
of employee turnover and retraining costs (Abraham & Prosch, 2000; Lazear & Gibbs, 
2009).  Therefore, by providing extensive training opportunities to employees, 
organizations can signal to employees their willingness to commit to the long-term social 
exchange relationship.  Under this condition, employees can form a psychological 
contract with the organization of social exchange relationship (Tui et al., 1997).  On the 
other hand, by providing fewer training opportunities to employees, an organization can 
send out a signal that it values long-term social exchange relationships with its employees 
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less.  Under this condition, employees are less likely to form a psychological contract 
with the organization of social exchange relationship (Tsui et al., 1997). 
Reducing pay can ensure the job security of employees at the cost of lower pay.  
On the other hand, downsizing can ensure the pay level of employees who stay at the cost 
of lower levels of perceived job security.  Therefore, by selecting the option of 
downsizing over reducing pay, an organization can send a signal that it values the 
economic exchange relationship, which is more short-term and focused on an economic 
inducement in exchange for employees’ contribution with its employees, over a long-
term social exchange relationship.  Under this condition, employees are more likely to 
form a psychological contract with the organization of economic exchange relationship 
(Tui et al., 1997).  On the other hand, by selecting the option of reducing pay over 
downsizing, an organization can send a signal that it values a long-term social exchange 
relationship over an economic exchange relationship with its employees.  Under this 
condition, employees can form a psychological contract with the organization of social 
exchange relationship (Tui et al., 1997).  
Under the condition of high investment in employee training, reducing pay, 
compared to downsizing, can better maintain the psychological contract between the 
organization and its employees.  This is because, in this case, the organization sends the 
congruent signals of valuing social exchange relationships with its employees.  
Alignment in messages from HR polices can strengthen, or better maintain, the 
psychological contract (Rousseau & Greler, 1994).  However, under the condition of high 
investment in employee training, downsizing, compared to reducing pay, can weaken the 
psychological contract between the organization and employees.  This is because, in this 
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case, the organization sends out incongruent signals of what it values in the employment 
relationship and employees can perceive the situation as a breach of the psychological 
contract.  Incongruence or misalignment of messages sent out to employees through 
inconsistency in HR policies is argued to be the cause for perception of violation in 
psychological contracts (Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Rousseau & Greler, 1994). 
Empirical studies show that the breach of a psychological contract reduces 
organizational trust and commitment (Cantisano, Dominiquez, & Depolo, 2008; Cassar & 
Briner, 2011; Ng, Feldnman, & Lam, 2010; Robinson, 1996; Zhao et al., 2007).  When a 
breach of a psychological contract occurs, employees question the integrity of the 
organization and become cynical or hostile toward the organization’s intentions (Zhao et 
al., 2007).  In a similar vein, when a breach occurs, employees can lose motivation to 
identify themselves with the organization and maintain their commitment to the 
organization (Zhao et al, 2007).  Breach of contract is likely to decrease the level of 
employees’ trust and emotional bonds in the employment relationship and their 
identiﬁcation with the organization (Robinson, 1996). This can lead employees to put 
their interests ahead of the organization’s interests (Cassar & Briner, 2011).  
 Under the condition of low investment in employee training, the organization 
sends out congruent signals to employees that it values an economic exchange 
relationship over a social exchange relationship by selecting the option of downsizing 
over reducing pay.   However, the effect of decision in labor cost reduction strategy 
(downsizing versus reducing pay) on organizational commitment can be less significant 
in this condition since employees’ trust and commitment toward the organization was less 
of an obligation in the first place (i.e. in economic exchange relationship).   
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The above argument of importance in congruence of signals can also be explained 
by the configurational approach in SHRM studies (e.g. Doty, Glick & Huber, 1993; Doty 
& Glick, 1994; Meyer, Tsui & Hinings, 1993; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Venkatraman & 
Prescott, 1990).  According to the configurational approach, an organization should 
develop an HR system that is horizontally fit.  Horizontal fit refers to the internal 
consistency of the HR policies or practices in an organization (Delery & Dotty, 1996).  
Although not directly explained from a psychological contract perspective, the 
importance of horizontal fit has led to the search and identification of “well-fitted” 
systems such as in high commitment HR systems and high performance HR systems 
(Lawler, 1986).  This argument has been strengthened by numerous empirical studies that 
shows the positive relationship between these well-fitted systems and organizational 
outcomes (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006; Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005).  
Therefore, I hypothesize as follows. 
Hypothesis 1
4) The relationship between collective organizational commitment and firm 
financial performance 
: Organizations’ investments in training of their employees will 
moderate the relationship between the selection of labor cost reduction strategy 
(downsizing versus reducing pay) and collective employee organizational 
commitment.  Pay-reduced organizations will demonstrate a higher level of 
collective organizational commitment than downsized organizations when their 
investment in employee training is high.  
A group of committed employees can be viewed as a valuable, relatively rare 
and firm specific resource that is difficult for other organizations to imitate for the 
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following reasons.  First, a group of committed employees can be valuable because 
they drive organizational performance by using discretion to carry out tasks in ways 
that are consistent with organizational goals (Arthur, 1994).  Supporting this view, a 
study of schools by Ostroff (1992) shows that the organizational commitment at the 
school level is positively correlated with various measures of organizational 
performance such as administrative performance, student behavior and satisfaction, 
and teacher quit intentions.  In a similar vein, a recent study by Chun and colleagues 
(2013) shows a positive link between collective organizational commitment and firm 
financial performance.  Second, a group of committed employees is a rare resource 
since individuals are becoming increasingly mobile and self-directed in their careers 
in response to wider economic, societal and technological developments, and thus 
career management or hierarchical advancement within the organization is less 
valued (Gubler, Arnold & Coombs, 2014).  Third, a group of committed employees 
is difficult to imitate since organizational commitment is specific to the firm and it is 
difficult to hire away the whole group of employees (Gong et al., 2009).  Moreover, 
a group may engage in synergetic actions that are difficult to imitate when 
employees in the group are all committed to same organizational goals (Barney & 
Wright, 1998; Gong et al., 2009). 
Based on the above argument, a group of committed employees can be viewed 
as a firm-specific human capital that is valuable, rare, and difficult for other 
organizations to imitate.  And according to the resource-based view (e.g. Barney, 
1991; Barney & Wright, 1998), firm-specific human capital should enhance firm 
performance.  Therefore, I hypothesize as follows. 
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Hypothesis 2
5) Moderated mediation model  
: Collective organizational commitment is positively related to 
firm financial performance. 
Since I have hypothesized the moderating effect of organization’s investment in 
training on the relationship between the choice of downsizing/reducing pay and 
collective organizational commitment (Hypothesis 1) and the positive relationship 
between collective organizational commitment and firm financial performance 
(Hypothesis 2), by extension, I also hypothesize that organization’s investment in 
training moderates the relationship between the choice of downsizing/reducing pay 
and firm financial performance.  Given that pay-reduced organizations will 
demonstrate higher levels of collective organizational commitment than downsized 
organizations when their investment in employee training is high (Hypothesis 1), I 
hypothesize as follows. 
Hypothesis 3
 
: The relationship between the selection of labor cost reduction 
strategy (downsizing versus reducing pay) and firm financial performance will 
be conditionally mediated by collective organizational commitment depending 
on the organization’s level of investment in employee training.  Pay-reduced 
firms will demonstrate higher level of financial performance than downsized 
firms through the mediation of collective organizational commitment when 
firms’ investment in employee training is high.   
3. Method 
1) Overview and sample 
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The data were obtained from the Human Capital Corporate Panel (HCCP), a 
publicly available database collected by the Korean Research Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training (KRIVET) in collaboration with the Korea Ministry of Labor.  
The stratified sampling frame represented all Korean businesses with more than 100 
employees, excluding mining, fishing, forestry, agriculture, foreign company subsidiaries, 
and public service organizations.  HCCP is designed to survey companies (for-profit 
organizations) and their employees about the companies’ HR systems, quality of the 
workforce, and their employee perceptions every two years starting in 2005.  Data from 
the 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 surveys are currently available.  On average, usable 
survey responses from 474 companies and 11,164 employees (average of 23.6 employees 
per company) were received in each survey year. 
Among the companies that participated in HCCP, only the companies that 
participated in two consecutive survey years 2007 - 2009 or 2009 - 2011, companies 
that are operated solely under the salary schedule pay system among various pay 
systems (other types of pay systems include job-based, competency-based, and 
individual annual contract based salary system), and companies with 5 or more 
employees replying to the organizational commitment questionnaires were included 
in the final sample.  Only companies that are operated solely under the salary 
schedule pay system were included in the final sample because whether an 
organization reduced its employees’ pay or not was determined by examining the 
change in their salary schedule over the two survey years (the detailed method of 
identifying pay-reduced organizations will be discussed in the following 
“measurement” section).  13.0% of companies that participated in HCCP were 
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operated solely based the salary schedule system.  Companies that participated in 
2005 HCCP were excluded in the final sample because the 2005 measure of 
organizational commitment was different from that of other survey years.  The 
measure of organizational commitment was consistent in the other three survey 
years. 
The final sample excluded firms with missing data and consisted of 50 data 
points.  The details of the data screening process are shown in Figure 1.  Among the 
50 data points, 32 data points were composed by the companies that participated in 
2007/2009 HCCP and 18 data points were companies participated in 2009/2011 
HCCP.  14 companies participated in both 2007/2009 and 2009/2011, composing 28 
of the 50 data points. The 50 data points are composed of 16 downsized companies 
(32%), 5 pay-reduced companies (10%), 3 companies that both downsized and 
reduced pay, (6%) and 26 companies that neither downsized nor reduced pay (52%).   
A comparison of the characteristics of the companies in the original survey 
(HCCP) and companies in the final sample for the analysis showed that there are no 
significant differences between the two groups in terms of firm financial 
performance (measured as in ROE) and collective organizational commitment.  
However, firms in the final sample tend to be smaller (the mean full-time employee 
for firms in the final sample = 490.5, the mean full-time employees for firms in the 
original survey = 834.5, t = 4.09), more manufacturing-centered (percentage of 
manufacturing firms in the final sample = 98%, percentage of manufacturing firms 
in the original survey = 69%, t = 4.54), and invest less in employee training (mean 
training cost per employee for firms in the final sample = 2.32, mean training cost 
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per employee for firms in the original survey = 5.14, in hundreds of dollars, t = 2.07) 
than firms in the original survey.  In the final sample, however, a comparison of the 
pay-reduced companies and downsized companies showed that there are no 
significant differences between the two groups in terms of firm financial 
performance, company size, industry, collective organizational commitment and 
investment in employee training.  The only significant difference between the two 
groups was the reduction ratio (which will be discussed in details in the following 
“measurement” section).  The details of the comparison between pay-reduced 
companies and downsized companies in the final sample are shown in Table 1. 
2) Measures 
Financial Performance.  Data from firms in the HCCP were merged with archival 
organizational-level performance data from the Korea Information Services (KIS), a 
partner organization of Moody’s.  Financial performance was measured in two ways.  
First, it was measured through return-on-equity (ROE, net profit divided by total 
equity).  ROE is often used as a measure of organizational financial performance in 
strategic HRM research (e.g. Delery & Doty, 1996; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009).  
A higher ROE indicates better financial performance.  Financial performance was 
also measured by dividing operating profit by total equity.  This measure is similar 
to ROE.  However, unlike ROE, which uses net profit as the numerator, this measure 
utilizes operating profit as the numerator.  Given that operating profit, compared to 
net profit, is a profit that is calculated after more controllable expenses and 
outcomes, it can reflect a firm’s performance more accurately than the net profit can 
(Koys, 2001; Chun et al, 2013).  In this study, the first financial measure will be 
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referred as “net profit based ROE” and the second financial measure will be referred 
as “operating profit based ROE”. 
Collective Organizational Commitment.  Collective organizational commitment of 
non-production line employees1
Organization types.  Based on their labor cost reducing strategy, organizations in the 
final sample are identified into four types: 1) pay-reduced, 2) downsized, 3) both 
strategies applied and 4) neither strategy applied. 
 was measured by using four item measures, which 
is the shortened and revised version of organizational commitment measure of Allen 
and Meyer (1990).  The four items were: “Too much in my life would be lost if I 
decided to leave my organization now”, “I would consider leaving this job if there is 
a better job offer”, “I feel as if this organization's problems are my own”, and “It’s 
worthwhile to be loyal to this company”.  These four items were aggregated to the 
firm level using the average measure (firm-level α = .82, Rwg(j) = .89, ICC(1) = .17, 
ICC (2) = .77). 
Pay-reduced organizations.  Companies participating in HCCP reported the absolute pay 
level of employees in the first year of the three non-production line job levels that are 
very common and found throughout companies in Korea: entry-level (Sawon), mid-
manager (Kwajang), and non-executive senior manager (Bujang). The question that 
HCCP asks of the HR managers is “What is the total annual pay amount (including base                                                         
1 In this study, the pay-reduced and downsized organizations were determined based on only the data of 
non-production line employees. The analysis model in this study is based on the implicit assumption that 
the pay reduction or downsizing of non-production line employees will have an impact, although disparate, 
on the organization as a whole and be related to the dependent variables.  Therefore, the collective 
organizational commitment level for only the non-production line employees was measured. 
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pay, allowances, bonus and incentives) of a first year Sawon (or Kwajang or Bujang)?” 
For a company that is operated solely based on a salary schedule pay system2
                                                        
2Four questions were asked of the organizations in the HCCP to determine their pay systems:  1) Does 
your organization use a salary schedule pay system?  2) Does your organization use a job-based pay 
system?  3) Does your organization use a competency-based pay system?  4) Does your organization use 
an individual annual contract based pay system?  Only the organizations that answered “yes” to the first 
question and “no” to the other three questions were selected in the final sample to avoid possible 
confounding effects in determining pay-reduced organizations.  For example, under the job-based pay 
system, the decrease in the pay level of the three positions could be due to the change in the composition of 
the jobs within the three positions, not due to actual pay reduction. (e.g. In time 1, large portion of the 1st 
year mid-managers could be in the high paying jobs.  However, in time 2 (after 2 years), large portion of 
the 1st year mid-managers could be in the low paying jobs.  The decrease in the pay level for the 1st year 
mid-managers over the 2 years could be due to this composition change.  Therefore, by examining only the 
firms that are operated solely based on a salary schedule pay system, I can exclude the possible 
confounding effect of job differences (by excluding job-based pay systems), competency differences (by 
excluding competency-based pay systems) and individual differences (by excluding individual annual 
contract based pay systems) on measuring pay reduction.  
 (with no 
use of job-based, competency-based, or individual contract-based pay systems), we can 
fairly assume that the three distinctive points in its salary schedule, which is a schedule 
that is applied to all employees in all job families of the company (except to the 
employees on the production lines), is being reported.  Therefore, we can determine 
whether the company has increased, reduced, or did not change the pay level of 
employees by examining the change in these three points over time with an assumption 
that pay amounts in other points of the salary schedule also changed in accordance with 
the change of pay amounts of these three surveyed points.  Reported pay of these three 
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points are added in time 2 (e.g. 2009), and this amount is compared with that in time 1 
(e.g. 2007).  If an organization’s added pay amount of these three points in time 2 is less 
than that in time 1, the organization is coded as a “pay-reduced organization”.  The 
change in the reported pay amount for each point in pay-reduced organizations was also 
closely examined to verify that the “reduction” in this added amount is not driven by a 
significant decrease in pay of one point while the pay in other two points were increased.  
Among organizations that are coded as a “pay-reduced organization”, this was not found.  
The change in pay was examined only through the change in nominal pay, not inflation-
adjusted pay.  Although the reduction in inflation-adjusted pay decreases purchasing 
power of employees, the decrease in inflation-adjusted pay without the decrease in 
nominal pay is less likely to be noticeable and affect employee’s perceptions toward the 
organization. 
Downsized organizations.  HR managers in companies that participated in HCCP were 
asked the following question: “Did the company engage in downsizing activities such as 
layoffs, buyouts, or spinoffs in last two years?”  If a company was engaged in a 
downsizing activity, the number of employees (number of non-production line employees 
and production line employees) that the company downsized was also reported.  Since the 
pay-reduced organizations were determined based on only the pay data of non-production 
line employees, only the companies that downsized non-production line employees were 
coded as “downsized organizations”. 
Neither strategy applied organizations. Organizations that neither reduced pay nor 
downsized were coded as “neither strategy applied organizations”. 
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Both strategies applied organizations. Organizations that both reduced pay and 
downsized were coded as “both strategies applied organizations”.  These organizations 
were not again coded as either pay-reduced organizations or downsized organizations.  
Therefore, the four conditions (i.e. pay-reduced, downsized, neither strategy applied and 
both strategies applied organizations) are mutually exclusive. 
Investment in training. Organization’s investment in training of its employees was 
measured through dividing the total cost in training by the total number of employees in 
the organization.  HCCP provided the information of both the total cost in training 
(including all direct and indirect costs) and the total number of employees.   
Control variables.  For the model with collective organizational commitment as the 
dependent variable (i.e. the model for testing hypothesis 1), company size (0 = 
companies with less than 1,000 full-time employees, 1 = companies with 1,000 or 
more full-time employees), year effect (2007/2009 = 0, 2009/2011 = 1), reduction 
ratio, average pay level, and past organizational commitment were controlled.  
Company size and pay level have been identified as antecedents of organizational 
commitment at the individual level in past studies (Mathieu & Zajac, 1980).  The 
average pay level was calculated by averaging the total annual pay amount of the 
three positions (i.e. 1st year Sawon, Kwajang and Bujang).  The reduction ratio was 
controlled to examine the pure effect of selecting one option over the other free from 
the effect of amount of pay or employees that organizations reduced.  For pay-
reduced organizations, the reduction ratio was calculated as the difference in the 
added pay amount of the three positions (i.e. first year Sawon, Kwajang and Bujang) 
between time 1 and time 2 divided by the added pay amount of the three positions in 
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time 1 (pay reduction ratio).  For downsized organizations, the reduction ratio was 
calculated as the reported number of downsized employees in between time 1 and 
time 2 divided by the total number of employees in time 1 (downsize ratio).  For 
both strategies applied organizations, the reduction ratio was calculated by adding 
the pay reduction ratio and the downsize ratio.  For neither strategy applied 
organizations, the reduction ratio was recorded as 0. 
 For the models with firm financial performance as the dependent variable (i.e. 
the models for testing hypothesis 2 and 3), company size, year effect, reduction ratio, 
and past firm financial performance were controlled.  The company size was 
controlled to consider the possible effect of economies of scale on firm performance.  
The reduction ratio was controlled to consider the labor cost-saving effect on firm 
performance.  However, industry was not controlled in the analysis model because 
the 50 firms in the final sample consisted of 49 manufacturing firms and only 1 
service firm and controlling for this difference didn’t make any significant 
difference in terms of the relationships of interest in the model.  Although the 
manufacturing firms can be largely grouped into automotive manufacturing, 
electronics manufacturing, and others, doing so also didn’t make any significant 
difference in terms of the relationships of interest in the model.  Also, a closer 
examination of these industries didn’t reveal any theoretical reasons to control for 
the differences.  Becker (2005) and Spector and Brannick (2011) posit that including 
nonsignificant or meaningless control variables can reduce the statistical power or 
distort the relationships among the main study variables and thereby be unnecessary. 
3) Analysis Model 
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The model of analysis with time frame is displayed in Figure 2.  The sample 
consisted of an unbalanced panel of companies who participated the HCCP survey 
in 2007/2009 and 2009/2011.  To apply the regression analysis method, I needed to 
decide whether to use a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) method, relative to 
making additional use of panel data method.  I decided to use the pooled OLS 
method for the following two reasons.  First, the purpose of this research is to 
compare differences in outcomes “between” companies with different labor cost 
reduction strategies, but not to compare differences in outcomes “within” companies.  
Second, the result of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (LM test)3 also 
suggested that the unobserved firm effects in the data is insignificant (p-values of 
the LM tests in all models were all larger than .05) and thus the pooled OLS method 
is more appropriate.  The effect of difference in time between 2007/2009 and 
2009/2011 sample was controlled. 
Collective organizational commitment = β0 + β1*Investment in training 
(Equation 1) 
+ β2*Pay-reduced organization + β3*Both strategies applied  
organization + β4*Neither strategy applied organization 
+ β5*Pay-reduced organization*Investment in training 
+ βi*Controls + ε                                                         
3 The LM test is used to check the presence of unobserved individual effects in the data. The null hypothesis 
in this test is that variances of individuals’ unobserved effects (firms’ unobserved effects, in this case) are 
zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, unobserved effects exist and thereby the panel data method should 
be applied. Otherwise, the pooled OLS approach is a more appropriate method (Zhang, Li, Li, & Zhou, 
2010).  
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 To test hypothesis 1, the significance of β5 in the above OLS Equation 1 is 
examined, where “Pay-reduced organization”, “Both strategies applied organization” 
and “Neither strategy applied organizations” are dummy variables denoting 1 as the 
variable name type of organization and 0 as otherwise.  Therefore, the base for 
comparison in this equation is the “downsized organization” and β2 denotes the 
difference between the average level of collective organizational commitment in 
pay-reduced organizations and in downsized organizations.  β5 denotes whether this 
difference is amplified as the investment in training increases.  ε denotes the error 
term. 
Financial performance = γ0 + γ1*Collective organizational commitment  
(Equation 2) 
+ γi*Controls + ε 
 To test hypothesis 2, the significance of γ1 in the above OLS Equation 2 will 
be examined. 
 To test hypothesis 3, the moderated mediation effect, I’ll follow the step-
wise procedure recommended by Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005). 
Financial performance = δ0 + δ1*Investment in training 
(Equation 3) 
+ δ2*Pay-reduced organization + δ3*Both strategies applied  
organization + δ4*Neither strategy applied organization 
+ δ5*Pay-reduced organization*Investment in training 
+ δi*Controls + ε 
(Equation 4) 
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Financial performance = ζ0 + ζ1*Investment in training 
+ ζ2*Pay-reduced organization + ζ3*Both options applied organization 
+ ζ4*Neither option applied organization 
+ ζ5*Pay-reduced organization*Investment in training 
+ ζ6*Collective organizational commitment 
+ ζ7*Collective organizational commitment* Investment in training 
+ ζi*Controls + ε 
According to Muller and colleagues (2005), the following three conditions need 
to be met to establish the moderated mediation.  First, the δ2 in Equation 3 should be 
significant (X → Y: overall main effect) while the δ5 in the same equation should 
not (no X*Mo → Y: no overall moderating effect).  Next, β5 in Equation 1 (X*Mo 
→ Me: moderating effect in the model with the mediator as the dependent variable) 
needs to be significant.  Finally, ζ6 in Equation 4 (Me → Y: mediator in the full 
model) should be significant.  However, when the mediation process is expected to 
be theoretically distal, then it may not be necessary to first test the X → Y 
relationship by using bivariate methods (Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  Considering that 
the process between HR polices and firm financial performance is generally viewed 
as a distal process (e.g. Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012), in this study, the 
significance of X → Y relationship in the first step will not be considered as a 
necessary step in establishing moderated mediation effect.  However, the procedure 
of estimating conditional indirect effect through bootstrapping will also be applied 
to supplement the test of overall moderated mediation process (Preacher, Rucker, & 




1) Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables are 
presented in Table 2.  Notable is the mean difference of pay reduction ratio and 
downsize ratio.  This difference shows that, on average, the ratio of reducing 
employees in downsizing cases is larger than the ratio of reducing pay in pay 
reduction cases.  The mean values of these two variables in the Table 2 were 
calculated including all the firms in the sample.  When only the pay-reduced, 
downsized, and both strategies applied firms were examined, the pay reduction ratio 
ranged from 1% to 8% (mean 3.4%) and the downsize ratio ranged from 1% to 72% 
(mean 15.4%).  However, when the notable 72% downsized case was excluded, 
downsize ratio of the downsized firms ranged from 1% to 37% (mean 12.2%).  The 
mean difference in these two ratios (8.8%) may not be large in terms of reducing 
labor costs considering the fact that the pay reduction ratio was calculated based on 
the nominal pay difference, not the inflation-adjusted pay difference.  The inflation 
rates from 2007 to 2009 and 2009 to 2011 in Korea were 7.6% and 7.1%4
                                                        
4 Based on the Consumer Price Index provided by the Statistics Korea 
(http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action). 
, 
respectively, and pay-reduced organizations would have had the similar labor cost 
reduction effect as downsized organizations if the downsized organizations had 
increased the pay level of remaining employees at least at the inflation rate.  Also 
notable are the differences between the current financial performance and past 
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financial performance.  This seems to reflect the economic recession since 2008.  
Finally, the significant positive correlation between collective organizational 
commitment and firm financial performance (r with net profit based ROE = .34, p 
< .05; r with operating profit based ROE = .38, p < .01) is also notable. 
2) Hypothesis testing 
Comparison of main effects. The results of pooled OLS regression are presented in 
Table 3.  The estimated main effects of labor cost reduction strategies on collective 
organizational commitment are shown in Model 1 of Table 3.  In the second step of 
the Model 1, the coefficient for pay-reduced organization on collective 
organizational commitment is not significantly different from zero (estimate = -.001, 
ns).  Therefore, the difference between the average level of collective organizational 
commitment in pay-reduced organization and in downsized organizations was not 
significant.  In the same model and step, the coefficient for neither options applied 
organization on collective organizational commitment is not significantly different 
from zero (estimate = -.030, ns). Therefore, the difference between the average 
levels of collective organizational commitment in downsized organizations and in 
neither options applied organizations was also not significant.  When the base for 
comparison in the model was changed to pay-reduced organization, the coefficient 
for neither options applied organization on collective organizational commitment is 
also not significantly different from zero (estimate = -.029, ns, not shown in the 
table).  Therefore, the difference between the average level of collective 
organizational commitment in pay-reduced organization and in neither options 
applied organizations was also not significant. 
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Hypothesis 1.  The estimated moderating effect of investment in training on 
collective organizational commitment is also shown in Model 1 of Table 3.  In the 
third step of the Model 1, the coefficient of the interaction term of pay-reduced 
organization and investment in training on collective organizational commitment is 
significant (estimate = .240, p < .05).  This suggests that pay-reduced organizations 
demonstrate a higher level of collective organizational commitment than downsized 
organizations as the investment in training increases.  This supports the Hypothesis 
1.  This interaction effect is plotted in Figure 3. 
Hypothesis 2.  The estimated main effects of collective organizational commitment 
on financial performances are shown in “Model 2” of Table 3.  In the second step of 
model 2a and 2b, the coefficients for collective organizational commitment on firm 
financial performances are both significant (estimate for net profit based ROE = 
16.743, p < .05; estimate for operating profit based ROE = 21.048, p < .05).  This 
shows that there are positive relationships between collective organizational 
commitment and firm financial performances.  Therefore, the Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. 
Hypothesis 3.  As described in the “Methods” section, recommended steps by 
Muller and colleagues (2005) will be followed in testing the moderated mediation 
effect.  First, the coefficient of the interaction term of the independent variable and 
moderator (pay-reduced organization*investment in training) in Model 3a and 3b of 
Table 3 are both insignificant (estimate for net profit based ROE = 5.511, ns; 
estimate for operating profit based ROE = 6.681, ns), suggesting no overall 
moderating effect of investment in training on the relationship between reducing pay 
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(compared to downsizing) and financial performance.  Therefore, the first condition 
of “no overall moderating effect (no X*Mo → Y)” is met.  Second, in Model 1 of 
Table 3, the coefficient of the interaction term of pay-reduced organization and 
investment in training on collective organizational commitment is significant 
(estimate = .240, p < .05).  Therefore, the second condition of “significant 
moderating effect in the model with the mediator as the dependent variable (X*Mo 
→ Me)” is also met.  Finally, in Model 4a and 4b of Table 3, the coefficients of 
collective organizational commitment on financial performances is both significant 
(estimate for net profit based ROE = 22.049, p < .05; estimate for operating profit 
based ROE = 27.303, p < .01).  Therefore, the third condition of “significant 
relationship between mediator and dependent variable in the full model (Me → Y)” 
is met.  Therefore, the Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
To secure stronger support for Hypothesis 3, I conducted a bootstrapping 
analysis utilizing the model 7 of the PROCESS macro by Hayes (2013) in SPSS (ver. 
21).  The result showed the significant moderated mediation effect of reducing pay 
(compared to downsizing) on firm’s financial performance through the mediation of 
collective organizational commitment that is dependent on the firm’s investment in 
training of its employees (moderated mediation index for net profit based ROE = 
5.041, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals [1.046, 35.267]; moderated mediation 
index for operating profit based ROE = 6.329, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals 
[1.297, 44.257] ).  More specifically, the conditional indirect effect of reducing pay 
(compared to downsizing) on firm’s financial performance through the mediation of 
collective organizational commitment was stronger and positive in the high 
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investment in employee training condition (effect size of 1 SD above the mean for 
net profit based ROE = 15.698, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals [3.049, 146.788]; 
effect size of 1 SD above the mean for operating profit based ROE = 19.755, 
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals [2.964, 178.539]) but was weaker and negative 
in the low investment in employee training condition (effect size of minimum value 
for net profit based ROE = -8.465, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals [-27.302, -
1.906]; effect size of minimum value for operating profit based ROE = -10.580, 
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals [-31.283, -1.979]).  Therefore, further support 
for Hypothesis 3 was provided.   
Robustness Check.  To test the robustness of the result, I re-ran the analysis with 
first excluding downsized organizations with downsize ratio of 20% or higher, and 
then also excluding the downsized organizations with the downsize ratio of 10% or 
higher, from the sample.  Although the downsize ratio and the pay-reduction ratio 
were controlled in the main analysis, the result may have been driven from the 
difference in the range of dependent variables influenced by the large differences in 
the range of the downsize ratio and the pay-reduction ratio.   After the first step, the 
downsize ratio of the downsized organizations ranged from 1% to 16% with the 
average downsize ratio of 6% (n = 14).  After the second step, the downsize ratio of 
the downsized organizations ranged from 1% to 9% with the average downsize ratio 
of 4% (n = 11).  The statistics in these two groups were much closer to those of pay-
reduced organizations.  The analyses in these two steps were exactly the same with 
the earlier result in that all the coefficients that were significant in the pooled OLS 
model of the main analysis were also significant, in same directions.  The only 
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noticeable difference was that the coefficient on the interaction term of pay-reduced 
organization and investment in training on collective organizational commitment in 
Model 1 became marginally significant (estimate = .199, p = .087) in the second step 
(i.e. in the step excluding downsized organizations with the downsize ratio of 10% 
or higher).   Bootstrapping analyses also yielded the same results as in the earlier 
main analysis in that the moderated mediation index, the interaction effect of 
reducing pay (compared to downsizing) on collective organizational commitment, 
and the effect of collective organizational commitment on firm financial 
performance was all significantly positive.   
 To address the concern of the relatively small sample size (N = 50) and 
check whether the result was driven by a few influential data points, I also re-ran the 
analysis by excluding the data points with values more than three standard 
deviations (SDs) away from the mean in terms of the key variables in the model (i.e. 
ROE, Collective Organizational Commitment, Investment in Employee Training, 
and Reduction Ratio, N = 48).  The pooled OLS regression analysis in this step also 
all yielded the same results as in the earlier main analysis.  The only noticeable 
difference was that the coefficient on the collective organizational commitment on 
firm financial performance in Model 1 became marginally significant (estimate for 
net profit based ROE = 14.574, p = .086; estimate for operating profit based ROE = 
18.214, p = .054).  Taken together, the results suggest the robustness of the main 
analysis. 
 
 5. Discussion 
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1) Implications 
The findings in this paper show that on average, there is no significant 
difference between the effect of downsizing and reducing pay on collective 
organizational commitment and firm financial performance.  This result indicates 
that in general, downsizing and reducing pay are indifferent options, in terms of 
collective organizational commitment and firm financial performance, which 
organizations can adopt in reducing labor costs.  However, results also show that 
reducing pay better preserves the level of collective organizational commitment than 
downsizing under the condition of high investment in employee training.  And in 
turn, this better preserved level of collective organizational commitment translates 
into better firm financial performance. 
Another notable finding in this paper is that on average, there is no 
significant difference in the level of collective organizational commitment between 
downsized and neither strategy applied organizations and between pay-reduced and 
neither strategy applied organizations.  Although the earlier studies at the individual 
level show that downsizing and reducing pay decreases the level of organizational 
commitment (e.g. Brockner, Gover & Blonder, 1988; Knudsen et al., 2003), the 
results in this study indicate that the collective organizational commitment at the 
firm level may not be affected too much due to these practices. One possible 
explanation for this result is the role of sorting (which was discussed in the theory 
and hypothesis section) that has often been overlooked. 
 The findings in this paper are important for several reasons.  First, although 
scholars have studied the effect of reducing pay and downsizing on employee 
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motivation and organizational performance, direct comparisons of the consequences 
of the two strategies have not been previously conducted.  The findings in this study 
are a starting point for considering which strategy may be a better choice relative to 
the other and under which circumstances.   The results of this study can provide a 
guide to management in deciding which labor cost reduction strategy to take, and 
when.  
Second, findings in this study challenge the thought of many employers that 
reducing pay is not a useful alternative to downsizing because reducing pay can harm 
employee morale more than downsizing (Bewley, 1998).  This study shows that under 
certain circumstances, downsizing can hurt employee morale more than reducing pay.  
The results in this study can urge organizations to carefully think about which type of 
signals that they are sending to employees before deciding which labor cost reduction 
option to implement. 
 Third, this study provides support for the configurational approach in SHRM 
(e.g. Doty et al., 1993; Doty & Glick, 1994; Meyer et al., 1993; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) by demonstrating the importance of “fit” 
among HR practices.  The results in this study show that the “fit” between 
investment in employee training and selection of labor cost reduction strategy 
(downsizing versus reducing pay) can be an important factor in maintaining the level 
of collective organizational commitment and yielding better firm financial 
performance.  This is also largely consistent with the psychological contract 
literature in that it suggests the importance of alignment between messages to be 
sent through HR practices since these messages contribute to beliefs by employees 
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in forming psychological contracts with their employers (e.g. Morrison & Robinson, 
1997; Rousseau & Greller, 1994).  
 Finally, this study lends further support that a group of committed employees 
can be a firm specific resource by establishing the link between collective 
organizational commitment and firm performance and successfully replicating the 
results in earlier studies (e.g. Ostroff 1992).  More specifically, the result shows that 
a one standard deviation increase in collective organizational commitment is 
associated with 5.2 unit increase in ROE. 
2) Limitations 
Despite the implications mentioned above, this study has some limitations.  
First, due to the fact that the sample is limited to the companies that are operated 
solely based on a salary schedule pay system, the generalization of this research to 
companies operating under different pay systems should be made with caution.  It’s 
more likely that an egalitarian type of culture may be formed under a more equal 
pay system, such as the salary schedule pay system (Tang, Furnham, & Davis, 2000).  
The use of downsizing under an egalitarian culture may affect employee morale 
more negatively than reducing pay.  The moderating effects of investments in 
training in this research may have been amplified due to the presence of egalitarian 
cultures. 
 Second, because I have drawn the sample from Korean companies, 
generalizing the results in this study beyond the Korean culture deserves 
revalidation.  Since the Korean culture is known to be highly collectivistic (Hofstede, 
1980), employees in Korea may expect and develop social exchange relationships 
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with their employers more than employees in individualistic cultures.  Therefore, the 
moderating effect of investment in training in this research may also have been 
amplified due to the presence of the collectivistic culture. 
 Third, my identification of pay-reduced companies may not be definite.  To 
identify pay-reduced companies, I examined three points in the salary schedule 
provided by the HCCP.  I had to make an assumption that the trends of change in the 
pay levels of these three points also applies to other unrevealed points in the salary 
schedule.   
Finally, this study doesn’t identify the exact time point of downsizing and 
reducing pay.  Therefore, the analysis model ignores the potential timing effect in 
implementing these practices.  For example, the analysis model assumes that the pay 
reductions implemented in the two different time points between 2007 and 2009 
have similar effect on collective organizational commitment and firm financial 
performance in 2009. 
3) Suggestions for future research and conclusions 
This study indicates that reducing pay, relative to downsizing, can be more 
or less effective depending on the circumstances (and vice versa).  More specifically, 
the study identifies the level of investment in employee training as a factor that can 
influence the effectiveness of these labor cost reduction options.  In the future, 
researchers may want to theorize and search for other circumstances, such as other 
HR practices, business strategies, business environments, cultures, or compositions 
of workforces, that can influence the effectiveness of these labor cost reduction 
options.  For example, since reducing pay can signal higher job security relative to 
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downsizing, reducing pay in organizations with a higher composition of the 
workforce that tends to value job security can be more effective over downsizing 
than in organizations with a lower composition of these types of employees. 
 Researchers may also want to closely examine the psychological processes 
of individuals that contribute to the relative effectiveness between the two labor cost 
reduction options.  For example, in this study, I theorized that downsizing can be 
viewed by employees as a breach of contract by the employer under the condition of 
high investment in training.  However, this process has only been theorized and has 
not been empirically examined.  Examining this psychological process can be 
interesting and also make a meaningful contribution to the psychological contract 
literature.   
 Finally, researchers may also want to test the findings in other cultural 
contexts and in organizations with other types of pay systems.  As mentioned above, 
the overall moderating effect of investment in training in this study may have been 
amplified due to the presence of a collectivistic culture and a pay system that 
emphasizes an egalitarian culture.  Replicating the study in different cultural 
contexts, especially in a strong individualistic context, would be interesting. 
 Despite the limitations, the current study offers theoretical insights and 
empirical contributions related to the dynamics of the relative effectiveness of 
different labor cost reduction strategies.  This study provides a partial answer to the 
question “which labor cost reduction strategy can be more effective”, and this can 
better fulfill the practical needs of management than to answer the question “does 
implementing a labor cost reduction strategy have negative consequences?”  The 
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study also responds to the needs of society for identifying reducing pay as an 
alternative to downsizing.  Among various labor cost reduction options, in contrast 
to implementing “brutal” downsizing, reducing pay often received attention by 
society and the media as a way to keep jobs and share the pain as a group (e.g. 
Hobson, 2009; Lewin, 2009).  Answering the question of which labor cost reduction 
strategy is more effective can be very important since downsizing and reducing pay 
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* Years outside the parenthesis denote the time frame for companies participated in 2007 and 2009 
HCCP surveys. 
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Table 1 
Independent-Samples T Test Comparing Pay-reduced and Downsized Organizations 
 
Variable Organization Type Mean Standard Deviation t-value p-value 
(1) Company Size1) 
Pay-reduced 353.6  202.9  
-0.369 0.716 
Downsized 397.9  242.5  
(2) Year Effect 
(2009/2011 =, 2007/2009 = 0) 
Pay-reduced 0.200  0.447  
-1.26 0.245 
Downsized 0.500  0.516  
(3) Reduction Ratio2) 
Pay-reduced 2.324  1.818  
-3.177 0.006 
Downsized 17.591  18.945  
(4) Average Pay Level3) 
Pay-reduced 345.333  38.341  
-1.655 0.114 
Downsized 415.000  90.325  
(5) Past ROE (Net Profit)2) 
Pay-reduced 7.130  5.600  
0.538 0.597 
Downsized 4.145  11.845  
(6) Past ROE (Operating Profit)2) 
Pay-reduced 11.264  7.474  
0.856 0.402 
Downsized 6.240  12.295  
(7) Past Collective Organizational Commitment 
Pay-reduced 3.498  0.378  
-0.214 0.833 
Downsized 3.537  0.349  
(8) Investment in Training3) 
Pay-reduced 1.268  1.355  
-0.36 0.723 
Downsized 1.589  1.829  
(9) Collective Organizational Commitment 
Pay-reduced 3.556  0.418  
-0.62 0.543 
Downsized 3.661  0.304  
(10) ROE (Net Profit) 2) 
Pay-reduced 6.840  8.491  
1.101 0.285 
Downsized -4.156  21.506  
(11) ROE (Operating Profit) 2) 
Pay-reduced 8.734  10.177  
1.107 0.282 
Downsized -2.808  22.287  
 
* Note: N = 16 for downsized organizations,   N = 5 for pay-reduced organizations 
1) In number of employees. 
2) In percentage 
3) In hundred dollars (US Dollar : Korean Won = 1 : 1000) per employee 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Variables 
 
Variables Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Company Size1) .080 .274           
(2) Year Effect 
(2009/2011 = 1, 2007/2009 = 0) .360 .485 .086    
      
(3) Pay Reduction Ratio2) .545 1.557 -.104 -.215         
(4) Downsize Ratio2) 5.840 13.303 -.131 .250 -.103        
(5) Average Pay Level3) 411.111 82.426 .288* .302* -.331* -.162       
(6) Past ROE (Net Profit)2) 8.378 15.342 .230 -.109 -.096 -.172 -.039      
(7) Past ROE (Operating 
Profit)2) 10.878 17.555 .179 -.170 -.108 -.207 -.004 .974
**     
(8) Past Collective 
Organizational Commitment 3.556 .320 -.148 .145 -.075 -.085 .291
* .182 .176    
(9) Investment in Training3) 2.319 2.572 .193 -.102 .423** -.071 .190 -.084 -.094 .039   
(10) Pay-reduced Organization 
(Others = 0) .100 .303 -.098 -.111 .385
** -.148 -.275 -.027 .007 -.061 -.138  
(11) Downsized Organization 
(Others = 0) .320 .471 -.202 .200 -.243 .612
** .034 -.191 -.183 -.041 -.197 -.229 
(12) Both Options Applied 
Organization (Others = 0) .060 .240 -.075 -.189 .765
** -.045 -.186 -.126 -.142 -.076 .402** -.084 
(13) Neither Options Applied 
Organization (Others = 0) .520 .505 .283
* -.030 -.368** -.462** .211 .255 .234 .110 .075 -.347* 
(14) Collective 
Organizational Commitment 3.591 .297 -.234 -.087 -.228 .048 .289
* .075 .066 .238 -.100 -.040 
(15) ROE (Net Profit) 2) 1.005 17.258 -.172 -.254 -.024 -.129 .172 .166 .180 .095 -.170 .114 
(16) ROE (Operating Profit) 2) 1.812 19.397 -.202 -.204 -.035 -.103 .180 .184 .195 .134 -.195 .120 
 
* Note: N = 50.  ** p < .01, * p < .05 
1) 1 = 1,000 or more employees, 0 = less than 1,000 employees.  The mean and standard deviation of company size in terms of number of employees was 490.5 
and 364.8, respectively. 
2) In percentage 
3) In hundred dollars (US Dollar : Korean Won = 1 : 1000) per employee 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Variables (Continued) 
 
Variables (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Company Size1)      
(2) Year Effect 
(2009/2011 = 1, 2007/2009 = 0)      
(3) Pay Reduction Ratio2)      
(4) Downsize Ratio2)      
(5) Average Pay Level3)      
(6) Past ROE (Net Profit)2)      
(7) Past ROE (Operating 
Profit)2)      
(8) Past Collective 
Organizational Commitment      
(9) Investment in Training3)      
(10) Pay-reduced Organization 
(Others = 0)      
(11) Downsized Organization 
(Others = 0)      
(12) Both Options Applied 
Organization (Others = 0) -.173     
(13) Neither Options Applied 
Organization (Others = 0) -.714
** -.263    
(14) Collective 
Organizational Commitment .163 -.208 -.029   
(15) ROE (Net Profit) 2) -.207 -.039 .144 .343*  
(16) ROE (Operating Profit) 2) -.165 -.053 .107 .379** .991** 
 
* Note: N = 50.  ** p < .01, * p < .05 
1) 1 = 1,000 or more employees, 0 = less than 1,000 employees.  The mean and standard deviation of company size in terms of number of employees was 490.5 
and 364.8, respectively. 
2) In percentage 





Pooled OLS Regression Results 
 
 
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 






Dependent Variable: Collective Organizational Commitment (Me) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
B SE B SE B SE 
Controls 
Company Size -.312† .157 -.327† .164 -.341* .156 
Year Effect (2009/2011) -.157† .089 -.168† .091 -.132 .088 
Reduction Ratio .306 .316 .266 .400 .233 .380 
Average Pay Level .002** .001 .002* .001 .002* .001 
Past Collective Organizational Commitment .105 .132 .098 .135 .006 .134 
Mo Investment in Training -.016 .016 -.005 .018 -.010 .017 
X Pay-reduced Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   -.001 .161 .249 .187 
 Both Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   -.259 .203 -.229 .193 
 Neither Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   -.030 .115 -.018 .109 
X*Mo Pay-reduced Organization * Investment in Training     .104 .240
* 
        
Model Fit 









Pooled OLS Regression Results (Continued) 
Variables 
Model 2a Model 2b 
Dependent Variable: 
Net Profit based ROE (Y1) 
Dependent Variable: 
Operating Profit based ROE (Y2) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Controls 
Company Size -13.056 9.159 -8.407 9.131 -16.709 10.221 -11.113 10.043 
Year Effect (2009/2011) -7.028 5.155 -6.461 4.987 -5.383 5.846 -4.706 5.585 
Reduction Ratio -11.041 19.086 -11.843 18.439 -9.831 21.613 -10.846 20.626 
Past ROE .198 .164 .156 .160 .221 .162 .183 .155 
Me Collective Organizational Commitment   8.135 16.743
*   9.030 21.048* 
          
Model Fit 
N R2 (F) R2 (F) Δ R2 N R2 (F) R2 (F) Δ R2 
50 .126 (1.624) 
.203† 
(2.240) .077





** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 










Pooled OLS Regression Results (Continued) 
Variables 
Model 3a 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit based ROE (Y1) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
B SE B SE B SE 
Controls 
Company Size -10.787 9.419 -12.520 9.713 -12.167 9.755 
Year Effect (2009/2011) -7.784 5.205 -7.607 5.375 -7.160 5.419 
Reduction Ratio -10.694 19.079 8.350 23.586 8.495 23.666 
Past ROE .173 .166 .144 .170 .130 .171 
Mo Investment in Training -.994 .971 -1.146 1.091 -1.317 1.113 
X Pay-reduced Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   9.192 9.459 15.131 11.777 
 Both Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   5.430 12.292 6.434 12.389 
 Neither Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   9.648 7.051 9.957 7.084 
X*Mo Pay-reduced Organization * Investment in Training     5.511 6.470 
        
Model Fit 
N R2 (F) R2 (F) Δ R2 R2 (F) Δ R2 






** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 







Pooled OLS Regression Results (Continued) 
Variables 
Model 3b 
Dependent Variable: Operating Profit based ROE (Y2) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
B SE B SE B SE 
Controls 
Company Size -14.067 10.486 -15.830 10.896 -15.446 10.926 
Year Effect (2009/2011) -6.342 5.901 -6.106 6.132 -5.592 6.170 
Reduction Ratio -9.559 21.571 9.280 26.734 9.350 26.787 
Past ROE .193 .164 .174 .168 .159 .169 
Mo Investment in Training -1.189 1.094 -1.330 1.232 -1.535 1.254 
X Pay-reduced Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   9.825 10.699 17.024 13.302 
 Both Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   5.583 13.928 6.750 14.014 
 Neither Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization)   9.456 7.940 9.803 7.965 
X*Mo Pay-reduced Organization * Investment in Training     6.681 7.308 
        
Model Fit 
N R2 (F) R2 (F) Δ R2 R2 (F) Δ R2 






** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 




Pooled OLS Regression Results (Continued) 
Variables 
Model 4a Model 4b 
Dependent Variable: 
Net Profit based ROE (Y1) 
Dependent Variable: 
Operating Profit based ROE (Y2) 
B SE B SE 
Controls 
Company Size 2.635 10.614 2.578 11.533 
Year Effect (2009/2011) -5.721 5.061 -3.831 5.616 
Reduction Ratio 5.790 22.125 5.572 24.423 
Past ROE .056 .161 .099 .155 
Mo Investment in Training -.976 1.047 -1.080 1.151 
Me Collective Organizational Commitment 9.058 22.049
* 9.936 27.303** 
X Pay-reduced Organization (vs. Downsized Organization) 7.190 11.334 6.997 12.481 
 Both Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization) 14.322 11.917 16.350 13.127 
 Neither Options Applied Organization (vs. Downsized Organization) 7.255 6.932 6.148 7.611 
X*Mo Pay-reduced Organization * Investment in Training 1.240 6.500 1.333 7.163 
Me*Mo Organizational Commitment * Investment in Training 8.782
† 4.505 11.020* 4.948 
      
Model Fit 







** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
※ Continuous variables in the interaction terms were mean-centered to reduce multicolinearity. 
 
